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Prepaid Legal Services in Illinois
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the legal profession has increasingly recognized'
the need to make its services more readily accessible to the large
segment' of the population comprised of middle- and moderate-
income persons.3 An innovative method of addressing this need,
currently commanding the attention of the legal community and
consumers, is group or prepaid legal service plans.4 Four United
States Supreme Court decisions' and the recently amended Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) Code of Professional Responsibility have
evoked experimentation with group legal service programs through-
out the United States.' In contrast, Illinois' statutes, cases, and
outdated ethical code discourage the development of such arrange-
ments.7 While other states have enacted legislation regarding pre-
paid legal services,' Illinois has merely adopted a supreme court rule
which requires group legal service programs to register with a judi-
cially established agency.9
This article will present the need for and the utility of group legal
services. After reviewing the Supreme Court decisions and the ABA
response thereto, this article will examine the law of Illinois cur-
1. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REVISED HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES: PAPERS
AND DOCUMENTS ASSEMBLED BY SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 2 (Rev. ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as REVISED HANDBOOK].
2. It has been estimated that these persons constitute 70% of the total United States
population. Id.
3. Moderate-income persons have been defined as those earning between $5,000$15,000
annually. B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 5 n.4 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as CHRISTENSEN].
4. There appears to be no uniformly accepted definition of group or prepaid legal services.
CHRISTENSEN, supra note 3, at 230. These terms are often used interchangeably. AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, A PRIMER OF PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as PRIMER.A
prepaid legal service plan has been defined as a "plan [or] system whereby a definable
portion of the population pays in advance for legal services which are to be rendered to the
subscribers in accordance with a definable schedule of benefits .. " Fisher & Gailey,
Antitrust Implications of Prepaid Legal Services in Texas, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 451, 452 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Fisher & Gailey].
5. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers
of America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Assoc., 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of RR.
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963).
6. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 3, at 250.
7. See notes 59 through 78 infra and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Texas Non-Profit Legal Services Corporation Act, TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art.
5, § 5.13-1 (Vernon 1975).
9. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 730 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
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rently governing prepaid legal services. Finally, recommendations
designed to facilitate the growth of prepaid legal plans in Illinois will
be offered.
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES
"Prepaid legal services" (PLS) is a generic term used to refer to
the two primary forms of group plans-open and closed panels. An
open panel permits members of the group to choose freely an attor-
ney; a closed panel generally provides members with preselected
attorneys, who are either direct employees of the group or members
of a panel of lawyers whose services are available.'0 There are four
general categories of PLS plans: (1) charitable and public service
programs; (2) membership programs; (3) programs conducted by
profit-making corporations; and (4) insurance programs." Although
most PLS plans have been initiated by organized or affiliated
groups such as labor unions or trade organizations, PLS programs
may become more prevalent among individuals lacking preexisting
group relationships.2
PLS are intended to lower the costs of legal services by spreading
those costs over a large number of individuals, i.e., in a manner
similar to the operation of insurance programs. PLS are usually
funded by the collection of money prior to the rendition of services."
These resources may be derived from the individual member, the
group itself, or a third party, such as an employer."
The scope of legal services offered by PLS plans has traditionally
been confined to job-related matters. 5 For example, union groups
have provided legal representation to members in litigating work-
men's compensation claims. However, in recent years there has
been a tendency to expand PLS coverage to encompass a wider
range of legal problems."
10. Fisher & Gailey, supra note 4, at 452-53.
11. Examples of the types of group legal service arrangements within each category in-
clude: (1) civil rights, legal aid, governmental and bar association plans; (2) labor unions,
professional and trade organizations, automobile clubs, and membership groups formed for
special purposes, such as taxpayer associations; (3) employer and commercial programs, such
as those maintained by banks; and (4) auto club insurance benefits and liability insurance
plans, such as those established by medical associations. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 3, at 233-
52.
12. PRIMER, supra note 4, at 4.
13. Id. at 3.
14. REVISED HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 1.
15. Id.
16. Prepaid legal service programs often provide consultation, preparation of legal docu-
ments and representation in connection with various civil matters unrelated to the sponsoring
organization's purpose. For example, a labor union may offer a PLS plan that provides legal
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The Need for and Utility of Prepaid Legal Services
There is a consensus of opinion that people with middle and lower
incomes do not use professional assistance appropriately in con-
fronting the complex legal problems posed by society. 7 Various ex-
planations have been advanced for the underutilization of legal
services by persons of moderate means. The most important reasons
are the failure to recognize that some problems should be handled
by an attorney,'" the lack of knowledge regarding one's legal rights, 9
the fear-real or imagined-of an inability to afford an attorney's
fees," and the unfamiliarity with the manner of procuring legal
services.' Consumers and members of the legal profession have
argued that PLS plans have the potential to alleviate the problem
of inadequate use of legal services. Adoption of PLS can result in
reduction of legal costs, education of persons regarding their legal
rights, familiarization with the process of securing legal services,
and prevention of future legal problems.
assistance in real estate transactions, divorce proceedings, general contract negotiations, as
well as workmen's compensation claims.
17. See generally Jones, Prepaid Legal Services and the Organized Bar, 27 BAYLOR L.
REv. 411 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Jones]; Comment, Group Legal Services, the Ethical
Evolution, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 531 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Group Legal Services].
Several research studies have documented the underutilization of legal services by persons
of middle- and moderate-incomes. A 1974 study disclosed that only 24.5% of those persons
having a legal problem actually consulted a lawyer. Another study demonstrated that while
80% of middle-class families recognized the need for an attorney's help, only 60% utilized an
attorney's services. Among the working-class, only 44% of those having problems availed
themselves of legal help. See B. CURRAN & F. SPALDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 83-
84 (1974); ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PLS, COMPILATION OF REFERENCE MATERIALS ON PLS 8
(1973) [hereinafter cited as ABA COMPILATION ON PLS].
18. Sorenson, The Future of Our Profession - Prepaid Legal Services, 54 Cm. B. REC. 219
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Sorenson].
19. Comment, The Shreveport and Columbus Plans of Prepaid Legal Services-An Anal-
ysis of Plans Presently in Operation, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 485 (1975).
20. When asked the reason(s) for not using a lawyer when legal services were required,
47.6% of the working-class respondents and 12.3% of the middle-class respondents answered,
"the inability to afford the fees." ABA COMPILATION ON PLS, supra note 17, at 11.
21. Fisher & Gailey, supra note 4, at 451.
22. The ABA has commented that the 70% of the population constituting the middle-class
seldom avails itself of attorneys' skills to plan for the future or to avert future difficulties.
Rather, they usually consult an attorney only when a crisis situation demands it. REVISED
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 2.
Preventive maintenance has been characterized as the primary objective of the legal sys-
tem. See Jones, supra note 17, at 412. PLS' usefulness in making legal services more readily
available and accessible to moderate-income persons has been summarized as follows:
The group device is unquestionably useful, and it does fill needs. By educating
group members about their legal problems and by making them aware of the availa-
bility of legal help, the group device encourages the assertion of individual rights
and claims that may not otherwise be asserted. By making lawyers readily accessi-
ble and by facilitating contact with them, it encourages the use of lawyers by people
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THE SUPREME COURT CASES: RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO
COLLECTIVE LEGAL ACTIVITY
In four major cases, the United States Supreme Court established
that there is a fundamental right under the first amendment to
engage in collective legal activity . 3 These decisions have been ac-
claimed as legitimizing group legal arrangements, and providing an
impetus for the growth and expansion of PLS.
In NAACP v. Button,24 the Supreme Court held that the
NAACP's rendition of legal representation to its members, a mode
of expression and association protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments of the Constitution, could not be prohibited under the
state's power to regulate the legal profession. The Court, in
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar 5 and United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar
Association, 26 reiterated that the first amendment guarantees of free
speech, petition, and assembly afford workers the right to act collec-
tively in asserting statutory rights, and that a state could not in-
fringe upon this constitutional right by invoking its power to regu-
late the professional conduct of attorneys. Finally, in United Trans-
portation Union v. State Bar of Michigan,27 the Court gave even
broader support to various group legal service arrangements by cau-
tioning that the principle underlying collective legal activity could
not be limited to the particular factual context under scrutiny.
who would probably not otherwise seek their help. By utilizing the purchasing
advantage enjoyed by a group to obtain the services of lawyers particularly compe-
tent in the fields of law of concern to the group, the group device enhances the
quality of legal services available to group members. And by lowering the cost of
legal services-through reducing the cost of rendering services and spreading the
cost among all members of the group-it is able to bring legal services to many
people who would not otherwise be able to afford them.
CHRISTENSEN, supra note 3, at 229.
23. See note 5 supra.
24. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In rebutting the State's contention that the "traditional purview
of state regulation of professional conduct" justified its restrictions upon the NAACP's activi-
ties, the Court commented:
[tihe State's attempt to equate the activities of the NAACP and its lawyers with
common-law barratry, maintenance and champerty, and to outlaw them accord-
ingly, cannot obscure the serious encroachment . . . upon protected freedoms of
expression. The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a compel-
ling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms . . . [A] State
may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitu-
tional rights.
Id. at 438-39.
25. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
26. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
27. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
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At issue is the basic right to group legal action, a right first asserted
in this Court by an association of Negroes seeking the protection
of freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The common thread
running through our decisions in NAACP v. Button, Trainmen,
and United Mine Workers is that collective activity undertaken to
obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right
within the protection of the First Amendment. However, that right
would be a hollow promise if courts could deny associations of
workers or others the means of enabling their members to meet the
costs of legal representation. That was the holding in United Mine
Workers, Trainmen and NAACP.28
In essence, these decisions provide that the first amendment safe-
guards an individual's fundamental right to unite with others to
secure effective and affordable legal representation. Absent a com-
pelling state interest in suppressing some substantive evil within the
state's regulatory competence, the state may not impede the exer-
cise of this associational right through the prohibition of a group
legal service arrangement.9
The four Supreme Court cases are factually similar. In each in-
stance, the group provided legal services that were related to the
primary goal of the organizaton. In Trainmen, UMW and United
Transportation Union, the unions provided assistance with labor-
related matters, while in Button, the NAACP's legal services per-
tained to civil rights issues. Each group aided its members in assert-
ing rights granted by the Constitution or federal statutes. The or-
ganizations, although rendering legal services, were principally cre-
ated and maintained to provide non-legal services, and furthermore,
had been in existence for several years.3" Moreover, the groups did
not provide legal services designed to yield pecuniary gain to their
respective organizations.
Under these circumstances, the group plans did not violate legal
professional ethics regarding solicitation, commercialization of the
profession, or lay interference with the independence of the attor-
ney." Each decision reflects a greater concern with furnishing to the
28. Id. at 585-86.
29. In Button, the Court stated that the state's valid interest "in regulating the tradition-
ally illegal practices of barratry, maintenance and champerty" was not sufficiently compel-
ling to prohibit the NAACP's legal activities. 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963).
30. For example, the NAACP was organized in 1909, with the overall purpose of helping
Blacks achieve equality under the law. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, founded in
1883, and the UMW Union, established in 1913, were designed to assist workmen in job-
related matters including, but not limited to, workmen's compensation claims.
31. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 441-43 (1963); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964); UMW, District 12 v. Illinois State
Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 225 (1967).
1978]
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public competent legal services at a reasonable cost, than with strict
adherence to state rules against solicitation and the unauthorized
practice of law.32
Nevertheless, the decisions are not dispositive of the group legal
service issue because a state might be able to advance a compelling
interest33 in regulating the practice of law, that might warrant intru-
sion upon the individual's right to group legal action. Since the
Court did not specifically identify any such interest, the proper
subjects for and extent of legitimate state restrictions on PLS re-
main unsettled.
The Supreme Court decisions also left unresolved the following
important issues regarding the establishment and use of PLS:
whether PLS may be created for the primary purpose of rendering
legal services; whether PLS may provide services beyond
organization-related matters; whether PLS can be organized pri-
marily to generate work and/or financial benefit for attorneys; and
whether PLS plans may actively solicit and advertise their services.
Due to the absence of definitive Supreme Court pronouncements on
these questions, a PLS planner should next turn to various bar
association codes for guidance.
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
PLS have provoked intense criticism primarily because group
plans challenge traditional principles of legal ethics. They have
been attacked as promoting the ethical violations of: maintenance,"
champerty, 35 barratry,3" solicitation, inciting litigation,37 advertis-
32. See Sorenson, Prepaid Legal Services and Their Relation to the Code of Professional
Responsibility-A Threat or Blessing, 62 ILL. B.J. 614, 617 (1974).
33. The court has not specified what would qualify as a compelling state interest. Rather,
Button, Trainmen, UMW and UTU all involved interests that were not compelling. See note
29 supra.
34. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 13, § 22 (1975) sets forth the penalty in Illinois for maintenance as
follows:
If any person should officiously intermeddle in any action that in no way belongs
to or concerns such person, by maintaining or assisting either party, with money
or otherwise, to prosecute or defend such action, with a view to promote litigation,
he shall be deemed guilty of maintenance, and upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined and punished as in cases of common barratry ....
35. Champerty is defined as "a bargain with a plaintiff or defendant, to divide the land
or other matter sued for between them, if they prevail at law; whereupon the champertor is
to carry on the party's suit at his own expense." BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 135 (1897).
36. Barratry is prohibited by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, § 21 (1975), which states:
If any person shall wickedly and willfully excite and stir up any suits or quarrels
between the people of this state with a view to promote strife and contention, he
[Vol. 9
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ing, channeling, and commercialization. 8 The strongest argument
against PLS focuses upon the potential destruction of the tradi-
tional attorney-client relationship. There is great concern that lay-
controlled legal service plans might exercise direct or indirect influ-
ence over their attorneys where a financial connection exists be-
tween the attorney and the organization. 9 The ultimate result of
interference with an attorney's independent judgment might be to
sacrifice the client's interests for the benefit of the sponsoring organ-
ization.
Despite the criticism launched against PLS from their inception,
the ABA formally urged state and local bar associations to initiate
and experiment with prepaid plans.4" The ABA stated that:
it does not oppose, but on the contrary encourages, the develop-
ment of any prepaid legal service plan designed to make legal
services more truly available to individuals if it provides assurance
of quality services at reasonable cost and is consonant with the
highest professional standards and the best interest of the public."
shall be deemed guilty of the petty offense of common barratry; and if he be an
attorney or counselor at law, he shall be suspended from the practice of his profes-
sion, for any time not exceeding 6 months.
37. It has been suggested that the prohibition against "stirring up litigation" rests upon
2 dubious premises: (1) that litigation is an evil in itself and that nothing should be done to
encourage it; and (2) that the assertion of even legitimate claims must be discouraged in order
to impede the bringing of fraudulent or frivolous actions. Such a passive system tends to serve
the interests of prospective litigants who have sufficient knowledge and power to make use
of the legal system. The assertion of legitimate claims has social value and should be encour-
aged. Thus, the "stirring up of legitimate claims that would otherwise go unasserted because
of the prospective claimants' poverty, weakness, ignorance or naivete may in fact be a positive
good." CHRISTENSEN, supra note 3, at 142-45.
38. Commercialization of the legal profession is said to involve the following: (1) lay
organizations other than clients obtain benefit, especially economic, from an attorney's pro-
fessional activities; (2) the profession is discredited through commercial forms of advertising
and improper solicitation of business; and (3) an intermediary device is used by unscrupulous
attorneys as a cover for improper solicitation schemes. Id. at 288.
39. Group Legal Services, supra note 17, at 529.
40. PRIMER, supra note 4, at 5-6.
41. Id. The ABA Code purports to encourage attorney involvement in PLS programs.
As a part of the legal profession's commitment to the principle that high quality
legal services should be available to all, attorneys are encouraged to cooperate with
qualified legal assistance organizations providing prepaid legal services. Such par-
ticipation should at all times be in accordance with the basic tenets of the profes-
sion: independence, integrity, competence and devotion to the interests of individ-
ual clients.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT 8C (1976) [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE].
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This commitment to PLS was translated into several ABA rules.
Analysis of the ABA Code's PLS Rules
The ABA rules relating to PLS generally have been regarded fa-
vorably by the legal community since they appear to encourage the
formation of PLS while safeguarding the integrity of the legal pro-
fession.4" However, in its effort to balance an individual's constitu-
tional right to engage in collective legal activity against a state's
regulatory authority to protect the public from professional miscon-
duct, the ABA has taken an overly cautious position. In direct con-
trast to the affirmative ABA commitment to the development of
PLS plans, the disciplinary rules adopted tend to be ambiguous,
inhibitory, and restrictive. Thus, while the ABA professes encour-
agement of PLS, it has imposed numerous restraints which may
lack adequate justification. The conservative ABA position may be
derived from the perceived threat PLS pose to private attorneys.
However, it has been advanced that this threat may be more imagi-
nary than real. 3
Although the Code's non-applicability to lay persons may seem
obvious, this factor is nevertheless significant, since the rules relat-
ing to attorney participation in PLS ultimately impinge upon the
right of lay organizations to establish such programs. An examina-
tion of the rules relating to PLS raise the question to what extent
the ABA is actually directing how consumers may operate their PLS
programs under the guise of regulating attorney conduct." Objec-
tions have been raised to the Code sections addressing publicity,
profit-making organizations, creation of work for attorneys, and re-
porting requirements.
Although "dignified" publicity may describe the availability and
nature of PLS plans, the participating attorneys' names may not be
disclosed to prospective members or beneficiaries of the plan.45 This
42. Group Legal Services, supra note 17, at 541.
43. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 3, at 285-87.
44. See Address by A. Morrison (May 9, 1975) reprinted in AMERicAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
FIF-rH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 139 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Morrison Address].
45. The relevant portions of Disciplinary Rule 2-101 (Publicity in General) provide:
[A] lawyer recommended by, paid by or whose legal services are furnished by, a
qualified legal assistance organization may authorize or permit or assist such organ-
ization to use means of dignified commercial publicity, which does not identify any
lawyer by name, to describe the availability or nature of its legal services. . . .This
rule does not prohibit limited and dignified identification of a lawyer. . . by name:
(6) In communications by a qualified legal assistance organization, along
with the biographical information . . . directed to a member or beneficiary
of such organization.
ABA CODE, supra note 41, at 9C.
[Vol. 9
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ban makes it unnecessarily difficult for consumers to reach in-
formed decisions regarding the quality of a PLS program, and thus
impedes increased plan membership. In view of Bates and O'Steen
v. State Bar of Arizona,"5 this publicity rule would probably be
unable to withstand constitutional challenge, and thus will un-
doubtedly be altered by the ABA.
Under another rule, both non-profit and profit-making organiza-
tions may offer PLS. However, only in connection with matters
where a profit-making organization bears the ultimate liability of its
members may it supply legal services through attorneys it employs,
directs, supervises, or selects." This provision is intended to protect
46. 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977). The Supreme Court stated that commercial speech tends to
serve individual and societal interests by assuring more informed and reliable decision-
making, and thus is entitled to some first amendment protection. In view of this case, it
seems likely that the DR 2-101(B) prohibition on disclosing attorneys' names to prospective
members will inevitably be altered, as this ban may interfere with individuals' abilities to
make informed decisions as to whether to join particular PLS plans. See Comment, Bates
and O'Steen v. State Bar of Arizona: From the Court to the Bar to the Consumer, 9 Loy.
Cm. L.J. 477 (1978).
47. The full text of Disciplinary Rule 2-103(D)(4) is as follows:
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that furnishes or
pays for legal services to others to promote the use of his services or those of his
partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm except as
permitted in DR 2-101(B). However, this does not prohibit a lawyer or his partner
or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm from being recom-
mended, employed or paid by, or cooperating with, one of the following offices or
organizations that promote the use of his services or those of his partner or associate
or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm if there is no interference with
the exercise of independent professional judgment in behalf of his client:
(4) Any bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes or pays for legal services
to its members or beneficiaries provided the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) Such organization, including any affiliate, is so organized and operated
that no profit is derived by it from the rendition of legal services by lawyers,
and that, if the organization is organized for profit, the legal services are not
rendered by lawyers employed, directed, supervised or selected by it except
in connection with matters where such organization bears ultimate liability
of its member or beneficiary.
(b) Neither the lawyer, nor his partner, nor associate, nor any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm, nor any non-lawyer, shall have initiated or
promoted such organization for the primary purpose of providing financial
or other benefit to such lawyer, partner, associate or affiliated lawyer.
(c) Such organization is not operated for the purpose of procuring legal
work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a private practitioner outside of
the legal services program of the organization.
(d) The member or beneficiary to whom the legal services are furnished,
and not such organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in the
matter.
(e) Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal services fur-
nished or paid for by the organization may, if such member or beneficiary
so desires, select counsel other than that furnished, selected or approved by
the organization for the particular matter involved; and the legal service plan
of such organization provides appropriate relief for any member or benefici-
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the public from lay interference with the attorney-client relation-
ship. The requirement presumes that an organization bearing the
liability of its member is less likely to influence or direct an attorney
to disregard the client's best interests. Nevertheless, the different
treatment of profit and non-profit organizations might also reflect
a greater concern with economics than with regulation of ethics.4"
This provision may unnecessarily deter profit-making organizations
from participating in PLS plans. The result sought to be accom-
plished by the ABA might be achieved by a less restrictive require-
ment directed at situations posing threats to the attorney-client
relationship, e.g., preventing the employed attorney from represent-
ing a member in a suit against the sponsoring organization.
In an effort to prevent solicitation of legal business and the
"commercialization" of the legal profession, another provison pro-
hibits the establishment of a PLS plan initiated or promoted pri-
marily to provide benefit to the organizing attorney, partner, asso-
ciate, or affiliated lawyer.4" The Code also proscribes the operation
of a plan in order to secure benefits for an attorney in his role as a
private practitioner outside the organization's legal service pro-
gram. 0 These provisions are ambiguous in that they do not deline-
ate what specific attorney activity is prohibited. In effect, if these
requirements are broadly construed, they may inhibit attorneys
from organizing PLS programs because such plans may appear to
be established for the primary purpose of yielding pecuniary gain to
the initiating attorneys. Yet, widespread availability of PLS re-
quires attorneys to assume more active roles in the creation and
ary who asserts a claim that representation by counsel furnished, selected
or approved would be unethical, improper or inadequate under the circum-
stances of the matter involved and the plan provides an appropriate proce-
dure for seeking such relief.
(f) The lawyer does not know or have cause to know that such organization
is in violation of applicable laws, rules of court and other legal requirements
that govern its legal service operations.
(g) Such organization has filed with the appropriate disciplinary authority
at least annually a report with respect to its legal service plan, if any, show-
ing its terms, its schedule of benefits, its subscription charges, agreements
with counsel, and financial results of its legal service activities or, if it has
failed to do so, the lawyer does not know or have cause to know of such
failure.
ABA CODE, supra note 41, at 11C.
48. Group Legal Services, supra note 17, at 542. There is no data to support the presump-
tion that profit-making organizations are more likely to interfere with the attorney-client
relationship than non-profit organizations.
49. See disciplinary Rule 2-103(D)(4), supra note 47.
50. Id. This provision is apparently designed to prevent the organization from being used
as a "feeder" for other legal practice. See Morrison Address, supra note 44, at 135.
[Vol. 9
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operation of group legal services.'
The ABA directive that all PLS programs be reported"2 has been
characterized as unrelated to ethical or disciplinary considera-
tions. 3 Filing a report with a disciplinary authority does not in itself
guarantee, or even encourage, greater compliance with the ethical
conduct required of legal professionals. Furthermore, the ABA Code
does not require other programs which employ attorneys to register
with a state disciplinary commission. No clear explanation has been
advanced for imposing this reporting burden upon PLS arrange-
ments. In addition to its failure to safeguard against attorney mis-
conduct, the reporting provision requires disclosure of information
to a disciplinary authority rather than directly to consumers. If the
rationale underlying this disclosure requirement is consumer protec-
tion, a question arises whether this purpose might be more effec-
tively accomplished by a nonlegal entity. Yet, this proviso has ap-
parently served as the impetus for the Illinois rule calling for the
written registration of all group legal service programs.54
PLS proponents have commented that the Code is biased against
PLS since it requires the programs and participating attorneys to
follow specified rules in order to "qualify. '5 The central issue con-
fronting the legal profession is not whether group legal services are
useful or even whether restrictions on PLS conflict with individual
constitutional rights. Rather, it is whether the Code's regulations
unnecessarily impair the ability of lawyers to discharge their pri-
mary obligation to make legal services available to all who want
them. One commentator has noted that "the public is not obliged
to prove its need; the legal profession is obliged to justify the restric-
tions.""7 It is submitted that the rules governing professional con-
duct within PLS plans should be guided by the consumer's perspec-
tive.
[The] availability of lawyers' services should be an important
factor in decisions about what lawyers are to be permitted to do
in offering their services to the public. For too long those decisions
have been made on the assumption that the profession's own inter-
ests and traditions were the only pertinent considerations. They
may be appropriate considerations . . .provided they can be
51. Id. at 140.
52. See note 47 supra.
53. Morrison Address, supra note 44, at 138.
54. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 730 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
55. Morrison Address, supra note 44, at 139.
56. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 3, at 230.
57. Id. at 256.
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shown to have some direct and significant relationship to the inter-
ests of the public. But tradition is not, in itself, sufficient reason
for professional restrictions that impair a lawyer's ability to fulfill
his primary obligation of providing services to the public. 8
The disciplinary rules should be more liberal in order to stimulate
more widespread and innovative experimentation with PLS pro-
grams. Only after attorneys and consumers gain greater familiarity
with PLS plans will there be an informed and valid basis upon
which to design regulations. In particular, the rules should facilitate
and encourage a wider variety of PLS arrangements, including non-
traditional plans initiated by attorneys, and programs offered to the
general public.
PLS IN ILLINOIS
Since the United States Supreme Court left unresolved the ques-
tion of the extent of the state's power to regulate the legal profession
without unwarranted infringement upon first amendment rights,
one should examine the Illinois Supreme Court's treatment of the
PLS issue. Unfortunately, the Illinois Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the PLS subject subsequent to the United States Supreme
Court decisions. Consequently, the Illinois opinions relating to
group legal services are of doubtful authority.59 In light of this lack
of guidance from the Illinois courts, one looks to the Illinois State
Bar Association (ISBA) Code of Professional Responsibility and Illi-
nois Supreme Court rules to ascertain the nature and degree to
which Illinois has regulated PLS.
While the ABA has translated its purported commitment for PLS
arrangements into relatively restrictive guidelines for their estab-
lishment, the ISBA, in contrast, has not even advanced that far.
The ISBA Code contains provisions identical to the ABA's original
controversial group legal service rule 0 The major criticism leveled
58. Id. at 172.
59. See In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958)(Legal
service program whereby clients' fees used to defray legal department's litigation expenses
invalidated); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1
(1935) (An association "can [not] contract with its members to supply them with legal
services, as if that service were a commodity which could be advertised, bought, sold and
delivered." Id. at 57, 199 N.E. at 4); People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate
Taxpayers of Ill., 354 Il1. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933) (Program in which the organization
"directed the attorneys and determined all questions to be litigated" invalidated on the
ground that it might interfere with the attorney-client relationship); People ex rel. State Bar
Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931)(Arrangement
prohibited primarily because organization permitted to appropriate legal fees). See also Peo-
ple ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Motorist Ass'n of Ill., 354 Ill. 595, 188 N.E. 827 (1934).
60. Disciplinary Rule 2-103(d) of the ILLNOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIaILITY 12-13
(1970) provides:
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against this version concerned the requirement that group legal
service plans comply with the "controlling constitutional interpre-
tation at the time of rendition of the services." This rule reflected a
narrow interpretation of the Supreme Court's first three decisions
on the group legal service issue."' After United Transportation
Union was decided, this version of the rule was characterized as
"unconstitutionally restrictive and too imprecise for safe and effec-
tive planning."62 Since the ISBA has not revised its vague, non-
directive PLS rule, the ISBA Code provides virtually no guidance
for PLS organizers. Since the ISBA Code's PLS rule was never
integrated into the Illinois Supreme Court rules, an attorney will not
be subject to disciplinary proceedings due to non-compliance with
the requirements of the provision."
Only Illinois Supreme Court Rule 730 specifically pertains to
PLS. 4 Under this rule, Illinois requires group legal plans to register
A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that recommends,
furnishes, or pays for legal services to promote the use of his services or those of his
partners or associates. However, he may cooperate in a dignified manner with the
legal service activities of any of the following, provided that his independent profes-
sional judgment is exercised in behalf of his client without interference or control
by any organization or other person:
(5) Any other non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes, or pays
for legal services to its members or beneficiaries, but only in those instances
and to the extent that controlling constitutional interpretation at the time
of the rendition of the services requires the allowance of such legal service
activities, and only if the following conditions, unless prohibited by such
interpretation, are met:
(a) The primary purposes of such organization do not include the
rendition of legal services.
(b) The recommending, furnishing, or paying for legal services to
its members is incidental and reasonably related to the primary
purposes of such organization.
(c) Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from the
rendition of legal services by the lawyer.
(d) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are
rendered, and not such organization, is recognized as the client of
the lawyer in that matter.
Amendment of the ISBA Code may be undertaken. One commentator has stated:
This Association will undoubtedly be giving prompt consideration to the ABA's new
amendments to determine whether they are properly responsive to any valid criti-
cisms and whether they or any other changes should be adopted by the CBA. In
the meantime, however, it is the Committee's responsibility to administer the Code
as approved by the CBA and ISBA ....
Note, CBA Committee on Professional Responsibility, 56 CHI. B. REc. 226, 235 (1975).
61. Address by H. Rock (May 9, 1975), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FIFrTH
CONFERENCE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 132 (1975).
62. Note, CBA Committee on Professional Responsibility, 56 CHI. B. REc. 226, 235 (1975).
63. Id. at 227.
64. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. ll0A, § 730 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) is entitled "Group Legal
Services," and became effective on May 1, 1977. It provides:
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with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. Pre-
sumably, the authority for Rule 730 is the state courts' traditional
power to regulate the practice of law. Such a premise is clearly
supported by the case law. 5 The Commission was established by the
supreme court in 1973 for the purpose of investigating conduct of
attorneys tending to bring the legal profession into disrepute."
Since Rule 730 does not address either attorney misconduct or
disciplinary procedures, the supreme court may have exceeded the
state's regulatory interest by delegating the authority to register
PLS to the Commission. 7 Rule 730 is an implicit assertion by the
Illinois Supreme Court that it, rather than another governmental
body, is the proper entity to control group legal arrangements.68 By
No attorney shall participate in a plan which provides group legal services in this
State unless the plan has been registered as hereinafter set forth:
(a) The plan shall be registered in the office of the Administrator of the
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission within 15 days of the
effective date of the plan on forms supplied by the Administrator;
(b) Amendments to any plan for group legal services and to any other
documents required to be filed upon registration of plan, made subsequent
to the registration of the plan, shall be filed in the office of the Administrator
no later than 30 days after the adoption of the amendment;
(c) The Administrator shall maintain an index of the plans registered pur-
suant to this rule. All documents filed in compliance with this rule shall be
deemed public documents and shall be available for public inspection . . .
(d) Neither the Commission nor the Administrator shall approve or disap-
prove of any plan for group legal services or render any legal opinion regard-
ing any plan. The registration of any plan under this rule shall not be con-
strued to indicate approval or disapproval of the plan;
(e) Plans existing on the effective date of this order shall be registered on
or before June 1, 1977;
(f) Subsequent to initial registration, all such plans shall be registered
annually . . .
(g) The initial and annual registration fee for each plan for group legal
services shall be $50.00.
65. In People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 349, 8 N.E.2d 941, 944
(1937), citing In re Day, 181 Il. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899), the court stated that the power to
regulate and define the practice of law is the prerogative of the judicial department. Also,
while the legislature may pass acts declaring unauthorized practice of law illegal and punisha-
ble, such statutes are merely in aid of and do not supersede or detract from the power of the
judicial department to control the practice of law.
66. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois
Brochure. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 751, entitled "Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission," states: "The registration of, and disciplinary proceedings affecting, members
of the Illinois Bar shall be under the administrative supervision of an Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission .. " RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS AND THE
ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION 1 (1977). Rule 752(e), entitled
"Administrator," states that, "[slubject to the supervision of the Commission, the Adminis-
trator shall: (e) maintain such records, make such reports and perform such other duties as
may be prescribed by the Commission .. " Id. at 2.
67. Letter from P. Dowd to Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (June 1,
1977) [hereinafter cited as Dowd Letter]. But see DR 2-103(D)(4)(g), supra note 47.
68. There is some question whether the state is preempted from requiring the reporting
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contrast, other states regulate PLS through the state bar associa-
tion"' or department of insurance. 70
There are several additional problems inherent in Rule 730. Most
significantly, the supreme court failed to include specific standards
for the establishment and operation of PLS plans in Illinois. At the
present time, the rule only requires plans to be registered. The At-
torney Registration and Disciplinary Commission has been specifi-
cally denied the authority to approve, disapprove, or render legal
opinions regarding the PLS plans submitted for registration. 71 With-
out such power to review or evaluate programs, the Commission is
clearly incapable of imposing sanctions, or providing useful guid-
ance for the organization of future PLS arrangements.
The supreme court rule is also objectionable because it exercises
control over the regulation of all PLS plans, including those devel-
oped solely by lay organizations. Since attorneys are forbidden to
participate in group plans which have not been registered under the
rule,72 the court has, in effect, imposed regulations upon associations
of laymen by restraining the activities of attorneys. 7' Lay organiza-
tions which choose not to register their plans with the Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission will be unable to secure
attorney involvement. Although Rule 730 does not appear to have
been adopted with the intent to restrict PLS, the registration re-
quirement seems to abridge the first amendment rights of the organ-
izers, members, and cooperating attorneys without demonstrating
a compelling state interest. 71
Moreover, no forms of legal associations other than PLS programs
are required to register with the Commission. Under Supreme Court
Rule 721, professional service corporations and associations for the
practice of law are required to file an application for registration
with the clerk of the court, not the Attorney Registration and Disci-
plinary Commission. 75 The Illinois Supreme Court has not advanced
any justification for the different and more burdensome treatment
of PLS programs regarding the registration requirement.
of PLS employee benefit plans by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1381 (Supp. V 1975). See Bowers, ERISA and its Exception, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 476
(1975); Comment, The Effect of ERISA on Prepaid Legal Services, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 566
(1975).
69. T~x. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.13-1 & art. 23 (1975).
70. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076, Rules 20 & 23 (1974) (West). WIs. STAT. ANN. § 256.294
(West Cum. Supp. 1977).
71. See note 64 supra.
72. Id.
73. Dowd Letter, supra note 67.
74. Id.
75. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 721 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
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The Commisssion requires an organization sponsoring a PLS
plan to submit documentation relating to the establishment and
operation of the plan."8 This documentation may include trust
agreements, articles of incorporation, by-laws, and the rules and
regulations of the plan. Rule 730 provides that the documents filed
in compliance with the Commission requirement are deemed to be
"public" documents." Some of those documents are already mat-
ters of public record. However, the requirement may impede adop-
tion of PLS since a lay organization may prefer to disclose informa-
tion regarding its plan's operation only to its members. Disclosure
of a program's mode of operation to outside planners may promote
disruptive rather than productive competition between organiza-
tions, thus possibly impeding improved quality of future PLS plans.
In contrast, other states having similar reporting requirements pro-
tect the confidentiality of much of the information received.78 Con-
sequently, it is submitted that only those documents already public
should be made available for inspection by non-members, apart
from Commission personnel.
Essentially, by requiring the registration of group legal service
plans, Rule 730 recognizes the propriety of PLS without providing
any specific guidance for their creation. Absent such guidelines,
PLS development and experimentation may be curtailed, since at-
torneys who are uncertain of the permissible scope of PLS may be
reluctant to participate.
Despite the lack of authoritative standards for organizing PLS in
Illinois, thirteen groups have registered legal service plans with the
Commission. 79Of those plans, three are "reduced fee" arrangements
rather than prepaid programs, three are affiliated with colleges or
universities, and eight of the group plans are connected with union
or trade organizations. Only one of the PLS programs involves an
organization established for the primary purpose of rendering legal
services.
To avoid intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, the exist-
ing programs preclude the organization from supervising the attor-
76. See note 64 supra.
77. Id.
78. For example, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256.294 (5) (West Cum. Supp. 1977), states in rele-
vant part: "All information filed pursuant to this section is confidential ... except the name
and address of its sponsoring organization, . . . and the names of the attorneys providing the
services. All reports are available to authorized representatives of the Supreme Court and the
State Bar for information purposes and for disciplinary and ethical investigations or proceed-
ings."
79. The names of these plans are on record with the Illinois Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission.
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ney. Moreover, they recognize the member as the client, not the
sponsoring organization. Claims against other group members or the
organization itself are excluded from benefit coverage to eliminate
potential conflicts of interest. Several plans provide legal "check-
up" services in an effort to deter the development of legal problems
and to prevent legal problems from reaching the crisis stage. Al-
though a PLS organizer might be tempted to rely upon these pro-
gram descriptions as examples of acceptable plans, it should be
noted that none of these programs received official approval.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE REGULATION OF PLS
If PLS are to be effectively utilized in Illinois, there is a need for
definite guidelines concerning their operation. There are at least two
procedures which can provide the necessary direction to attorneys
and lay persons interested in organizing PLS. First, the courts, or
some other designated agency, can undertake a case-by-case analy-
sis of PLS plans. This approach would require the formulation of
principles delineating the permissible limits of PLS. 5 Those princi-
ples could then be applied to PLS plans subsequently called into
question. In this manner, organizers of PLS could determine, in
advance, whether a proposed plan's mode of operation would be
acceptable, rather than develop a plan entirely based on speculation
as to its validity.
Although a case-by-case application of principles may provide
flexibility in determining the acceptability of particular group
plans, more specific criteria would offer the benefits of predictabil-
ity, consistency, and ease of application." This method of providing
specificity would entail legislative enactments, similar to those
adopted in Texas, 2 California, 3 and Wisconsin. 4 Allocating the re-
sponsibility for formulating workable guidelines to the legislature
rather than to the court system may also produce standards more
responsive to the interests, needs, and desires of the ultimate con-
sumer."
80. One commentator suggests that an evaluation of PLS programs should consider and
weigh the following factors: 1) the extent to which the possibility exists for serious conflict of
interest between the providing organization and the individuals receiving services; 2) the
extent to which the organization may have the opportunity and power to exert control or
influence over the attorney; and 3) the value of the program to society. CHRISTENSEN, supra
note 3, at 270.
81. Id. at 277.
82. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.13-1 & art. 23 (1975) (Vernon).
83. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076, Rules 20 & 23 (1974) (West).
84. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 256.294 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
85. Consumers can exert pressure upon their legislators to act in compliance with the
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It is imperative that consumers participate in the decisions con-
cerning the proper regulation of PLS. The need for consumer input
is especially acute since the power to impose restrictions upon PLS
has thus far been assumed by attorneys, the very persons possessing
the exclusive license to engage in the regulated enterprise." The
legal profession, in fulfilling its obligation to make legal services
more readily available to all segments of the population, should act
to increase public awareness of the existence of and need for PLS
programs.7
Since the judicial branch may be more inclined to translate the
vested interests of the legal profession into restrictive PLS guide-
lines, it is preferable to give regulatory authority to the legislature.
Perhaps the most important function of a PLS regulatory measure
is to ensure consumer protection by requiring adequate disclosure
regarding a program's operations. Between the judicial and legisla-
tive branches, the latter may be better qualified to formulate valid
and flexible guidelines which adequately balance encouragement of
PLS expansion as well as protection of consumers.
CONCLUSION
"The battle about the propriety of [prepaid legal] services is
over, but the question of the extent of their use is not." 8 This com-
ment accurately reflects the present situation of PLS in Illinois. In
view of the United States Supreme Court cases and the recently
adopted Illinois Supreme Court Rule 730, there is little doubt that
PLS plans in Illinois are valid arrangements. However, the nature
of the legitimate restrictions upon the establishment and operation
of PLS is uncertain. This is primarily because of the lack of authori-
tative statements on the issue. Organizers are confined to outdated
case law, the unamended ISBA Code, and a group legal service rule
public's desires; the court system is more insulated from such direct influence.
86. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 3, at 255.
87. Restrictions on solicitation and advertising would probably need to be relaxed in order
to enable attorneys to engage in educational endeavors and to make PLS more fully available
to the public.
[Tihe fundamental thing we at least have to do as a first step is, where we are
dealing with organized groups, be they groups organized in the past as a trade union
or consumer groups who are simply organizing and trying to solicit other members
to come into their non-profit scheme to be able to get group legal services, those
programs ought to be able to advertise. They ought to be able to receive solicitations
from the members of the bar, saying, "We can do a better job and we can do it for
less."
Morrison Address. supra note 44, at 141.
88. Comment, Current Problems Facing the Legal Profession-Part I, 57 CHI. B. REC. 109,
114 (1975).
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with no operational guidelines.
In order to transform the ethical commitment "to assist in mak-
ing legal services fully available" " to the public into a reality, attor-
neys need to become active participants in delivering legal services
to moderate-income persons through the mechanism of PLS. To
enable attorneys to meet their obligation to the public, Illinois has
a responsibility to do more than merely sanction the existence of
group legal service plans through a court rule. Illinois must formu-
late specific, workable guidelines for the organization and operation
of PLS in order to foster attorney involvement in these arrange-
ments. Several viable alternatives exist for achieving this result.
The Illinois State Bar Association Code and Disciplinary Rules
should be revised and updated to reflect an attitude toward PLS
which is more liberal than that of the American Bar Association. In
addition, and most importantly, the Illinois legislature should enact
specific statutory provisions both governing the operations of PLS,
and delegating the responsibility for ongoing supervision and regu-
lation to some governmental agency or commission.
Illinois has taken the initial step toward the recognition of PLS
through Supreme Court Rule 730. However, much work remains to
be done to ensure the necessary expansion and growth of PLS plans.
The ISBA, the Illinois Supreme Court, the state legislature and
consumer groups must cooperate in developing liberal guidelines for
the establishment and operation of PLS. Only through such con-
certed action can the theoretical commitment to PLS be trans-
formed into the tangible rendition of legal services in Illinois.
FAY TRIFFLER
89. ABA CODE, supra note 41, CANON 2.
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